Rome 4th July 2017
State of the art of the RASMORAD Project
(Director General for out-of-prison service of sentences – DGMC)
She thanks all Italian and foreigner participants.
In order to counter a phenomenon, we should understand it first, therefore information and knowledge sharing is essential, as it is the case for European projects.
Penitentiary administrations are engaged in the prevention of the phenomenon and intend to develop a common operating tool within both prison and probation, lined up on the same side, with the involvement of Probation Services and local community.
Prison staff training is fundamental to be able to identify and recognise radicalised or radicalising individuals.
The Department of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) relies on the European partnership for multi-agency cooperation strategies, rehabilitation and reintegration. It aims at embracing a broader concept of conviction by extending it to the entire system, including probation setting.
The Rasmorad project plays a fundamental role from this perspective.
Riccardo Turrini Vita
(Director General for training – DAP)
The questionnaire reveals the different aspects of our research aimed at “preventing and countering violent radicalisation within prison and probation settings”.
It deals with violent radicalisation: currently, as the formulation of questions show, the attention is focused on the religious component of the phenomenon, stimulated by the numerous international terrorism groups which want to be perceived as a theological and moral need of Islam.
Religion-based terrorism is not the only possible case, though. In the past, Italy experienced radicalisation within prison of Marxism-based terrorist groups, thus theoretically atheists. In this case, terrorism is limited to that kind of violent radicalisation, determined by actions resulting in deaths, injuries and destruction, which exploits, more broadly, means of dissemination different from personal persuasion.
This is important because it limits our research and the following interventions within the scope of religious freedom and association.
What is required is the prevention and countering within prison context and under the Community measures and sanctions.
The scope of prevention is much broader than that of countering because prisoners who undertake radical and violent path may be everywhere. In our research, prevention shall be carried out mainly through the encoding of revealing indicators, from simpler indicators, such as changes in habits, to more complex ones. They are very variable and require a deep examination. It is necessary to agree on such indicators to meet the Rasmorad’s target of developing a risk assessment protocol.
When considering these indicators, we will have to apply the above-mentioned restriction and criterion dealing with existing or potential violence of radical choices.
The questionnaire structure:
it is divided into different question sections relating to different investigation fields:
- prevention management within prison;
- awareness about cultural differences in dealing with prevention;
- linkage with social rehabilitation programs (they are usually called trattamento rieducativo, that is rehabilitation treatment, in Italy)
- application of the counter-narrative method;
- identification of the so-called protective factors (those aimed at distancing individuals from violent actions);
- connections between, on one hand, prevention and countering interventions and, on the other hand, prudence in prison security and the observance of discipline within prison.
(Project researcher – Siracusa International Institute for criminal justice and human rights –ISISC – Syracuse)
Data Analysis – Questionnaire 1’
She intends to show collected data. First of all, she speaks about methodology: in order to develop the questionnaire, she identified the main and more relevant topics relating to project targets, in particular:
- risk identification;
In order to identify these topics, she resorted to literature investigation (Farad Khosrokhavar, Olivier Roy, COE guidelines, RAN documents, etc.).
The researcher highlights the fact that decoding and comparing data collected from the different penitentiary administrations was not an easy task. She needs more data and more time.
As regards the first general outcomes, there are good answers and ‘promises’ of undertaking many practices; the major effort made by prison and probation (P&P) services to prevent violent radicalisation was the creation and implementation of new prison regimes.
The first question section deals with the linkage between Special regime and human rights.
Special regimes for preventing radicalisation, almost everywhere are usually established by national policies and not at the local level. The decision of establishing special regime for a certain detainee is made by administrative authorities and it may be the result of a multidisciplinary process, carried out differently by each country.
In Belgium, France and Italy, there is a complementary regime whose targets are preventing proselytism, limiting its propagation within prison and improving the identification of radicalisation. All partners have different prison regimes, but almost each of them has a specific regime aimed at countering violent radicalisation. More work should be done in order to overcome these differences, from which some suggestions can be made.
Some countries use the isolation regime which aims, among other things, at preventing proselytism and limiting the propagation of violent radicalisation.
The selection of detainees to be assigned to special regime is also different. In France and Italy, those who commit terrorism-related offences may be prosecuted and not convicted. The situation is different in Belgium, where there are prisons specific for male prisoners, but not for female prisoners. Special regime in prison is established by administrative decisions while courts and social service workers’ opinion are not relevant in this sense. This topic should be further discussed in order to make proper decisions and the rights of prisoners and their family relationships should be further considered.
As regards the ‘effects’, it will be necessary to ask the partners to give more information about family visits and video surveillance, if available. The isolation regime has, among its effects, limitations (in terms of freedom of movement, different types of activities, family visits). Few countries talk about video surveillance regime, monitoring over communication, etc.
The second question section deals with Cultural differences and prison management, that is, the management of detainees in relation to the exercise of religious rights and preservation of a peaceful environment within prison.
Each country recognises the freedom of religion during imprisonment, but prohibits proselytism, and country sets out different rights and practices: individual, collective, different modalities for the visits of religious leaders, different relations between the State and religious authorities.
Religious practice modalities (especially daily practices, such as morning prayer or diet) are different among different States and even among different prisons within the same State. In France, Muslim detainees sometimes do not ask for particular meals during Ramadam as they fear of being discriminated and exposed to prejudices. More information are needed in this field so to avoid the possibility of conflicts, and because of the absence of a complete set of ‘internal’ rules allowing for a peaceful management of cultural diversities within prison.
The more complex questions were aimed at detecting Rehabilitation measures and prevention programs within prison. There are policies for preventing radicalisation of vulnerable people who are not under special regime. The real problem seems to be how to prevent radicalisation through treatment programs. Programs experimented globally were discussed.
As regards the rehabilitation field, each country has its own education and sport programs, and almost each country, except Cyprus, have work programs. Access to work depends on the prison security level. These programs are carried out in Italy, France and Belgium. Other countries have sport programs and library only; they organise other activities at the individual level, though. In Italy, radicalised detainees can work in the prison wings where they are placed and which are reserved for them. Nuoro and Rossano experiences hold much importance and significance.
A special program, worth sharing, aimed at enhancing tolerance, reducing ethnic violence, preventing and countering inter-ethnic violence is carried out in Bulgaria only.
In France, a program is carried out, on the basis of which prisoners who intend to develop dialogue with other prisoners may organise talks and propose the involvement of experts, which are then invited by the penitentiary administration, subject to its approval.
The use of ‘counter-narrative’ method holds much importance. There are different situations: Belgium uses this method with the help of collaborative Imams, who want to work with the penitentiary administration through this strategy. The researcher thinks that the same problems may be faced by social service workers as well.
As regards Italy, many tailored programs exist and the counter-narrative approach is at its initial stage. The systematisation of the ‘counter-narrative’ concept is needed, establishing and understanding rules, experimenting and identifying the exact method. Training and launching pilot projects are fundamental in this sense.
(Director – Directorate General for Training – DAP)
In Italy, treatment programs are to be implemented, as required by law, and it is possible to select them. As far as counter-narrative is concerned, we must still identify a method and we should set out specific rules. We are not against this method at all. We all try to keep prisoners in a calm and peaceful environment and the counter-narrative method would certainly contribute to this end.
We should probably learn to measure the impact of given methodologies, rather than assessing them, which is a less ambitious but more rapid target. We should consider the actual impact on our countries.
Developing alternative-narrative and/or counter-narrative experiences within prison or MAP (messa alla prova, a type of probation) requires supporting work rather than real training.
It is necessary to understand if each country agrees on the fact that counter-narratives are already disseminated within prison and, if so, within which environment/context.
The radicalisation phenomenon is scarce or almost negligible in some partner countries, as it emerges from the answers to questionnaires.
Investigation on the current and past protective factors operating in these countries (Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria) has been carried out.
Questions aim to identify among the possible protective factors, those that make these countries almost unfamiliar to massive violent radicalisation, both in prison and national territories.
The reply of the delegated member of Romania:
Among the other possible answers, we shall highlight that in Romania there are not large groups of Muslims and the small groups are well integrated in the community. Romania is a transit country to the West and it is not an arrival country. Obviously, deeper explanations of expert sociologists and political scientists are needed but it would be too long to explain them. In order to develop the question and the answers a focus group with the countries delegated in the same situation has been suggested.
The reply of the delegated member of Portugal:
In Portugal there are many cultural and historical reasons. Muslim groups are very small and Portugal was one of the first countries to talk about liberal attitudes with offenders. This is a protective factor for us but unfortunately the same situation did not happen in other countries with similar legislations and we need to investigate. Immigration of this country has always been poor and one of the main reason could be its geographical location. The focus group implementation has been accepted. Society in general tends to undervalue these problems but normally prison is not a problem that concerns only Portugal.
The reply of the delegated member of Bulgaria:
In Bulgaria, many protective factors have occurred, but the representative member is not sure about answering this question by herself because many other institutions have to be taken in consideration.
U.C.O.I.I. representative member
There is already a management model when a Muslim enters to prison and it has been implemented by Muslims. The Imam’s role is different in each prison. We should work together in order to establish a religious management model decided by us and not by other people. According to the popular thinking, Imam is a priest, a bishop or similar: on the contrary, Imam is just a prayer guide during the worship moments. Different Imam figures have developed over time such as community teacher or guide. However, the question is: what is the right formation to provide and which Imams should receive it? What do we have to teach in order to make him a spiritual guide in the community? Should we teach the religious aspect or the human sciences basis? Radicalised Muslims have their own language. Generally, Imam uses a more different and more moderated language and this is the reason why radicalised Muslims do not recognise him even in worships. In the past, we used to follow radicalisation signs, in particular habit changes such as offenders who decided growing a beard and/or wearing a white robe etc. but habits have changed and those attitudes may be insignificant today. We have to analyse these topics with expert communities around the table.
The discussion has shown the importance of establishing an interreligious debate; facing problems on a conceptual level, now it is necessary to think about methods. Among them we can find: prevention, capacity building and dynamic security. A deep training against racism, islamophobia and intolerance is needed. For example, Belgium is developing training courses in order to raise awareness within probation officers and prison staff members.
Italy is also implementing the P&P training.
Dynamic security is very important and it requires an active exchange of good practices and a specific training.
The most relevant themes resulting from the analysis are:
- how to develop a good “social” environment in prison;
- the communication linkage between security and P&P services, how to improve trust in relationships;
- overcrowding in prisons VS dynamic security suggestion;
- how can intelligence services cooperate with each other and how can information circulate;
- which are the most appropriate modalities of the protective factors research? (Often, the way in which information are shared is already a protective and development factor concerning dynamic security in prison).
Questions concerning health and (dynamic) security management in P&P should be added in the questionnaire.
Italian and European experiences
Nuoro and Rossano prisons.
(Nuoro prison’s Commissioner)
Since a year and a half, in Nuoro we have been working with offenders that were convicted of and condemned for Islamic international terrorism. A small section is dedicated to female offenders who are convicted of the same offence.
A short description of the Nuoro prison is provided. This structure can contain prisoners convicted of Islamic offences because each building of the prison is separated from one another (high and middle security circuits and work release section).
In Nuoro prison, the main types of offences are:
- Islamic terrorism offences (High Security);
- mafia and criminal association offences (High Security);
- violation of the law related to drug offences and life sentenced offenders (Middle Security);
- different offences and offenders with a past of deviance (Middle Security, work release section).
Among international terrorism offenders (7 men and 3 women both Italians and Moroccans) 1 international terrorist “recruiter” was identified. A high profile analysis for all the 10 offenders is required. Too much time spent in isolation cannot be the correct choice and giving them more independence could be the right answer. Individualised behavioural initiatives are provided: 2 of them participate in paint workshops. The group, including a guardian, a counsellor and the prison police, constantly supervise them. The attentive and constant monitoring of the radicalisation indicators provided by the NIC (Nucleo Investigativo Centrale della Polizia penitenziaria, in English Central Investigative Department of the penitentiary police) have brought results: religious practice, attitude and relationships with others, daily routine, comments on political events or natural disasters. At first, some of them did not speak Italian and did not succeed in communicating with anyone so, in order to make them more independent in communicating Italian literacy classes were created. All of them respect the Islamic faith and they do not have a leader. They alternate each other in leading the worship and just a few of them wear a vestment (for example a tunic).
By monitoring their attitudes, it emerged that the women group constantly create a division with others offenders and staff members. Instead, one prisoner of the most cooperative group assumed the mediator and the leadership role: this could be a mimetic form (the offender wears Western style clothes, he/she speaks perfectly Italian, he/she married with a converted Italian and he/she knows well the Koran scriptures).
Basically, the Imam is unavailable in our prison. There are some problems in finding one.
As already said, among these offenders some of them shown several radicalisation elements, others are reconsidering their own ideas, and one of them is keeping his/her mimetic leadership. The male section staff is composed by 11 penitentiary police unit, divided into daily duty shifts and the female section staff is composed by 9 penitentiary police unit.
The most relevant attitudes are written down during every shift in order to keep monitoring. With regard to meetings, “radicalised” offenders can have 4 visits per month and 2 phone-calls (each phone-call can last 10 minutes and requires a prepaid card) according to the laws, but many of them do not want a visual meeting, so they can have more phone-calls through the consulate representatives.
Prison director – Rossano, Calabria
In the past years, nobody knew about Rossano prison and radicalisation was completely unknown. According to history, the first Islamic offences date back to 2010. In 2008 radicalisation was still unknown, but in 2009 the DAP established High Security circuits (HS1, HS2, HS3). The structure was selected along with other 2 institutes in order to contain HS2 circuit, which includes Islamic international terrorism offences. In 2010 building works were realised in order to ensure security and equal dignity and rights for these offenders. From the beginning, we have tried to ensure that all of them, even HS2 cases, received treatment activities, worship freedom and worship and community spaces.
Subject to exceptions, these offenders are allocated one per bedroom. They are 8 per floor on 2 levels and bedrooms are 12 square metres. Everything needs to be developed in their “area” and they cannot meet offenders from different areas. The only activity that they can do outside their area is sport in prison’s gym but they still cannot meet other offenders.
In order to ensure worship, they can pray twice a day every day. At first, radicalised offenders refused working with female operators. Gradually, these offenders accepted them and understood prison rules. They don’t resist, maybe because they are more aware of detention.
Radicalised offenders participate in many activities: guided reading courses, school, interviews with operators and mediators and external volunteers. The issue concerning the beard and its care have tackled: some of them used to dye their beard with red henna, an element that, according to some information on the Internet, seemed to be a severe radicalisation sign. Actually (says the U.C.C.O.I.I. representative member) this is a fundamentalism sign more than a radicalisation one: in ancient times, elderly used to dye their white beard with henna roots in order to seem younger.
In conclusion, since 2010 Rossano structure has been hosting about 60 charged for and convicted of international terrorism offences. The first generation was more violent and aggressive, less ideological and anti-institutional. Gradually, over time, this generation has became a group of people who proclaim themselves as an Imam, they are not troublemakers, they do not look for a fight because they are smart, skilled, ideologised and they try to create a debate with other offenders. Sometimes they are provocative but it’s still a risk putting these offenders that are not charged according to the 270 bis law, who maybe are not radicalised, with others presumably more “dangerous” in this area. As already mentioned, also camouflaging is an adaptation attitude: from December onwards, we have noticed an adaption attitude when the radicalisation phenomenon has developed and many of them (50%) stopped praying.
U.C.C.O.I.I. representative member asked a question about the presence of a cultural mediator and if he/she works in this department. The speaker replies that at first prisoners refuse having cultural mediators, mostly because this professional figure is always a woman. Initially, the prisoners wanted to an Islamic mediator, but then they accepted the other mediators. Among critical issues: it is said that mediators that have the same religion of the radicalised offenders could be in some way manipulated by leaders.
Dr. Castellano underlines that in Italy, particular attention on the identity and the “stranger” culture is paid: surely, this has helped and helps improving the general situation and promoting dialogue.
The Commander of the Rebibbia Female Prison of Rome takes the floor. He talks about the initial difficulties in the Islamic offenders management without the Imam and/or the cultural mediator figures. The prison’s chaplain has always contributed being a sort of mediator figure.
Barbara Napelli, Penitentiary Police Supervisor of NIC, wants to highlight attention on the importance of relation and information exchange with the Strategic Committee for the fight of international terrorism. She also highlights that EIV circuits (Elevato Indice di Vigilanza, in English High rate of security) switched to HS2 circuits which are specific for international terrorism offenders. Long ago, when different offenders groups meet each other they became allies (organised crime and radicalisation, sometimes terrorism). The choice of using circuits has always been difficult, but we must avoid the radicalisation of the weaker subjects.
4th July 2017 (afternoon continuation)
Dr. Ciavarella introduces the different experiences of Bologna and Prato prisons. Other European experiences are presented.
Bologna prison Commander
In Bologna there are 21 prisoners convicted for radicalisation offences.
Among the effective operational practices Incremented security measures are extremely important, in particular window bars are reinforced in high risk cells where Arabic writings are written on the wall. The potential increase of these writings is reported on an Excel file.
Another element that is taken into account is family attitudes: the family members of the offenders, such as his/her wife/husband or another relative, suddenly changes his/her way of dressing, or suddenly change his/her behaviour towards Penitentiary Police or operators. Bologna prison offenders have never refused a female doctor appointment. We want to underline again the importance of cultural mediators as a major resource. They often listen to offenders prayers and we have tried to make prayer moments a collective occasion, but only 1 or 2 are provided per month and moving 120 offenders would be difficult. The Researcher Delphine Verheyde asks a question about worship in common spaces. The Commander replies that a screening room is also available for prayers 1 or 2 times per month.
Prato prison Commander
The Middle Security area of Prato prison hosts 78% of the total offenders number: it is like a prison in a prison that has different types of offenders.
In the prison, the number of convicted prisoners is higher than other prisoners typologies. Half of the convicted prisoners are foreigner.
Italian and foreigner offenders radio is unbalanced: 353 foreigner offenders (58%) come from North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia), Albania and China (Prato attracted a great number of people from China because of its textile industry) and 276 Italians (42%). In Middle Security section foreigner offenders are the majority (70%) and most of them practice Muslims religion in a quiet manner. About 50/60 offenders participates in Friday celebration: in the Middle Security section 2 spaces were used as a Mosque, but now only one of them is used because there is only Imam (one prisoner). For about a year and a half, cultural mediators are not in the structure anymore: this is a serious problem that we hope is going to be solved from September. Cultural mediation is fundamental in this structure hosting more foreigner than Italian offenders, and many of them do not speak Italian. Offenders can use the space used as a Mosque every Friday.
According to NIC references, a monitoring activity has been implemented. Monitored offenders are fewer because, as already said, there is no HS2 section.
Why do we implement violent radicalisation monitoring activities if there are no prisoners charged for or convicted of international terrorism offenders?
- Because those activities are needed in order to monitoring necessities and behaviours according to penitentiary rules;
- because prison is an extraordinary “Monitoring Centre”;
- because prison is the first place where proselytism is spread: the less offenders are integrated in a community, the more they seek comfort in religion as a combining element (Nigerians are Christian but they bring their rosary only in prison). The more weak and fragile they are, the more they search for an identity.
3 levels of monitoring:
- high monitoring: prisoners with international terrorism offences (HS2) or proselytism and recruitment offences;
- middle monitoring: offenders that are close to a radicalised ideology or proselytism;
- low monitoring: offenders that required a deeper analysis and control because they could switch to the other 2 levels.
The attention is focused on radicalisation indicators identified by European studies. Those indicators would not necessarily emerged because many offenders keep a low profile or manifest a detachment to extremism.
For example, religious practice is monitored: how the offender pray, how much he/she prays, if he/she is an Imam etc. Religion is seen as a necessity for identity in compulsory environments. Over time, some offenders change their attitude and completely isolate themselves. Monitoring activities concern how offenders are dressed, if they have a beard, if they are willing to speak with female operators and if they draw or write ISIS glorification symbols. All of these attitudes and relations information are provided to NIC.
Researcher Delphine Verheyde asks how can these offenders be monitored.
The answer is: according to institutional rules, control and monitoring activities are practised in every area. Those activities do not last 24h – however, offenders are monitored during community activities and some of them are required to keep their prison door opened. Operators and agents perform daily control activities: we know which one go to school, who is willing to talk with educators, who isolate him/herself, who applies for a job. For example, if an offender spreads the word concerning his/her willing to join up ISIS and leave for Syria, investigations are made in order to understand if it is true or not. Indicators are reference points: writing, attitudes, relations with female operators, changes in the way of dressing or the choice of a beard.
Iris Naert – FOD Justitie (Belgium referent)
Her work concerns the training of the penitentiary staff charged in monitoring. Many Belgian prisons encourage “dynamic security”: this activity can be considered as the common thread of the central policy implemented in prison and in staff training.
Security is fundamental during initial training. However, it is also important developing an overall and interpersonal and social skills. During training, many techniques are taught: how to behave in the first with contact offenders, how to resolute and face conflicts and aggression and many drug addiction courses as well as others focused on psychiatric problems are implemented.
At the end of the training, the future staff members have to draw up a report whose score is added to the final tests and to the exams score.
Being sensitive towards offenders needs is essential, but we must be careful about exploitation attempts. In this sense, a case used in training has been presented: an offender actor simulates receiving a bad news during a search. This a perfect test in order to understand how they relate to each other during a case like that. We also teach how to handle with radicalized offenders, for example, in order to speak with radicalised prisoners, we use anti-violence communication techniques. However, despite these courses, central policy has to promote dynamic security by the Projects. Among security reinforcement projects, there is the Offenders council: in fact, in Belgium there is an Offenders council that allows prisoners to participate in prisons management (for example interviews or food issues). There are many offenders in the council that are elected by other offenders, staff members and by a “governor”. In the council, staff has to work in order to implement positive relations with offenders, encouraging communication among them and prisoners. Thanks to this council, there were many important changes. For example, in the past thay only had half an hour to eat and after that they had to get back to work. Now offenders have more time and they get back to work at 4pm. Moreover, racism episodes are reported and this is a very crucial result.
France (first speech):
Three French referents explains different situations.
At first, there is a description of the French prison system starting from an overview on the penitentiary organisation dating back 1911. In 1999 the Minister of Justice is reorganised in several services: in particular, the probation service that involves a multidisciplinary staff with counsellors, doctors, teachers etc.
First of all, we have to highlight those situations concerning violent extremism in prison. In the past decade a new radicalisation model has been implemented.
As everybody knows, there is a big problem with terrorism and radicalisation in France. Many of our operators take charge of terrorism offenders. The first experiment concerned the creation of a “prison in a prison” in a huge penitentiary area, with about 465 terrorism offenders. In our prisons, many offenders are charged for international terrorism and some of these cases are dangerous: some offenders failed to leave for Syria; some of them reach this aim and come back (even women with children); some of them are called “foreign fighters”. About 300 radicalised terrorists stayed in Paris. We managed to isolate all of these offenders in a huge prison, but it didn’t work: we could not work with a group of terrorists, because they gather themselves in groups spreading violent ideology. We thought about the creation of a mixed system: the first attempt was protecting the most vulnerable offenders. Since 2014, we have been recruiting specially trained penitentiary staff working with offenders that are possibly exposed to violent radicalisation.
There are several profiles in prison: we have to identify which profile adjusts to one particular offender in order to determine his/her needs and risk level. At first, an identification of those offenders who are possibly exposed to violent radicalisation is required.
The first step is the problem/type individuation is the first step. More than a thousand of offenders are possibly exposed to radicalisation, even though they are not charged for terrorism offences. There are 500+130 offenders in probation charged for specific offences. Our first priority is following offenders related to Islamic terrorism. We indeed have created a multidisciplinary team, including an educator and a counsellor supporting educational staff and probation officers. Specialised units have been created in order to examine offenders charged for Islamic terrorism there are 4 specific units for assigned offenders and an assessment and containment units.
Violent radicalisation disengagement is more emphasized than de-radicalisation process. Several aspects are considered: the radical ideology level of the offender, the risk that he/she represents, his/her willing to commit a violent action, the efficacy of detention and treatments on prisoners.
Some offenders are in the security area for violent offenders. Several activities have been developed concerning this area, for example keeping violent offenders away from others because they are more inclined to proselytism or many of them try to incite violent acts and are more refractory. This area can contain up to 28 offenders (now they are 17).
The assessment of the offenders assignment in different areas requires a multidisciplinary and a unique Commission meeting (operators, security staff member, counsellor, educator etc.). This Commission discusses about the assessment and after 4 months a brief report that includes offenders assignment suggestions is written. This report is subsequently shared with the Intelligence service. The decision takes into account the offenders geographic collocation in order not to concentrate all of them around and in Paris. With regard to accused offenders and those who are not convicted moving, it requires the judge authorisation, while permanent offenders decisions are up to the Penitentiary Administration.
An offender can be assigned in a normal area if his/her risk level is low and can be managed with other offenders, also taking into account his/her family networks. However, if the risk is higher but manageable, an offender can be assigned in one of the 27 specific institutes in which violent disengagement programs and release strategies and programs for the prison staff empowerment are implemented. If the risk level is higher, the offender is allocated in security regime areas, in isolation, in normal prison or in severe prisons in a sector for violent offenders. 70 out of the 465 aforementioned offenders are under isolated regime, the others are managed in ordinary sections.
France: 2 more speeches
The experience of Moulins Penitentiary Centre
The experience of a high security prison within the Moulins Penitentiary Centre is introduced. This French prison accommodates radicalised detainees and does not follow European practices strictly. The premises are the same but, at the end of 2011, it was decided to present a road map project for the following years. According to Article 29 of the French Penitentiary Act, all admitted prisoners were involved in several reintegration and rehabilitation activities within a penitentiary project focused on prisoners and their prison lives, also aimed at de-radicalisation. In order to ensure the security of more than 1000 prisoners separation in groups was implemented, among which one is for foreign fighters. It was decided to create different spaces for activities (gym, etc.) and start to work in group, carrying out the staff training.
One of the prison objectives of the prison was the direct observation through specific tools and indicators, in order to live in harmony and gradually work together. A programme was also developed for the prevention and control of violence and a special radicalisation Commission was established.
The supervision staff have taken part in all meetings with advisory bodies. Data were collected and then implemented. New skills have to be developed within this approach. This approach has been implemented for trial for three years through specific data analysis, meetings focused on violence and Commissions for special risks, in order to protect internal security and detect indicators for social measures. A common system, whether radicalisation was violent or not, was followed and there was an attempt to test different methods and several activities, such as recreational activities like sports events with external teams. Prisoners have appreciated these activities enabling a responsibility regime. A differentiated regime is carried out through observation and rehabilitation indicators. For example, the “closed-doors” regime, which requires detailed work and levels of professionalisation (the speaker left five documents focused on five different types of detention and staff instructions, for consultation and photocopying). The aim is the creation of an experimental system in order to ease the institutional actors’ work in preventing violence (a kind of differentiation between good prisoners and less good prisoners).
A question in relation to the possibility of carrying out a similar observation approach in the probation context has risen.
Answer: the treatment and assessment in terms of social staff are very close. Prison and probation contexts have the same staff and indicators. Probation services help people in daily life, they need more time: it is a big challenge; prison services invest less time in research. Interfaith dialogue with prisoners is carried out also in Moulins.
To conclude, each of us is very involved and holds responsibilities it is a way to prevent violence and enhance, in practical terms, rehabilitation. Furthermore, on one hand, this system protects the staff and, on the other hand, it offers some advantages for prisoners.
- Director of the prison of Lyon
In order to identify who is leading a radicalised life, an experimental programme which takes into consideration the adopted lifestyle has been developed in Lyon.
There is a behavioural programme which, on the basis of different questions (on the individual and social identity), analyses psychiatric problems trying to create a new way of thinking among participants.
This programme tries to give the “how to” tools, for example, how to “reprogramme” one’s life both from a social and an emotional point of view.
There have been selected some de-radicalised prisoners, 9 professionals (such as officers, psychologists, pedagogists, etc.) as well as 2 leaders; this selection is usually based on common experiences. Then, different steps are identified: first, talking about feelings and behaviours; second, carrying out the dynamic phase which consists in different exercises, role playing activities and more. This is a multidisciplinary approach which involves everybody, including prisoners. They are very involved. There has been an attempt to influence personal elements and solve negative aspects.
This three-phase approach allows prisoners to reconnect with their private and emotional sphere, thus encouraging both the physical (including their physical aspect) and emotional dimension.
At the end of the first programme, there will be an assessment. Nonetheless, the entire programme has not been completely evaluated yet.
A question from Dr. Ciavarella: “which criteria have you used within this project to select prisoners, manipulable and vulnerable individuals and/or violent offenders?”
Answer: “for the moment, we have excluded terrorist offenders, as a first step. In the next phase, we will seek to involve more complex personalities”.
The Bulgarian experience – Bulgarian representative
As previously mentioned, there are no cases of radicalisation in the Bulgarian penitentiary community. A case is presented in which, after the arrival of a new prisoner, a Bulgarian citizen extradited from Turkey who professes himself to be a Muslim and talks about “revenge”, the foreigners group becomes more reactive to prison staff. It seems to be a case of radicalisation since an entire group changed after his arrival.
The Bulgarian representative (psychologist at the Sofia Prison) reports two other physical violence cases attributable to the so-called radicalisation phenomenon: three Syrian men, living in Germany and leading a normal life (one of them held a degree in Arabic language and worked for the Red Cross and another one also held a degree), wanted to return in Syria apparently to meet their families but actually to fight. They talked about “revenge” and they have a lot of photos of foreign fighters in their phones. They behave in a very collaborative way, they are calm as prisoners, they do not refuse to talk with the female staff. However, these elements are not sufficient as fundamental indicators.
As a psychologist, the Bulgarian representative affirms that the majority of these prisoners, more than 50%, have personality disorders, even considering the restrictive conditions to which they are subject.
A detailed research has been carried out on the prevention measures, among which giving a meaning to the life of individuals and team-working are considered important.
During the first phase, when the social worker receives the necessary information for the compilation of the record, radicalisation signs may already be present; during the second phase, individuals are assigned to or taken in charge by the social worker (individualised programmes, mediation with foreign institutions and families). In order to prevent changes towards radicalisation, treatment activities are to be encouraged before prisoners’.
The prison psychologist has to make a diagnosis in cooperation with the social worker and prison staff.
Among the launched programmes, there are those on anger management and tolerance promotion within or outside the prison context. There are also educational activities based on the learning of the Bulgarian language and religious activities, with the collaboration, for example, of Imams (external to prison) in addition to Orthodox and Catholic priests.
The result of this experience is, on one hand, the promotion of several activities and, on the other hand, the reduction of the recidivism risk.
5th July 2017 (morning)
Prevention of radicalisation: experiences
(Prison Director – Torino)
Nowadays, we give a great importance to the reception phase in the prison of Turin, especially towards those charged of offences, in order to avoid several problems which were present until three years ago. This allowed the application of a series of interventions which produced positive results already in the first year. 40% of the individuals admitted to the prison profess themselves to be Muslims. Some positive changes still have to be carried out in dealing with them. In order to increase the relations with the mosques located in particular sensitive areas of the city, I have started to contact different local agencies, such as the Forum dell’Immigrazione (Immigration Forum). Islamic offenders previously did not have any opportunities, they were only allowed to pray on Fridays in miserable rooms; in order to improve this tense atmosphere in the prison, it was necessary to act on prisoners’ needs, following the Constitution principles.
The Islamic religion is not widely accepted in Turin. We have organised workshops focused on the Islamic faith, we have encouraged the presence of Imams and volunteers in prison in order to send out a clear signal of acceptance and tolerance. We made the theatre available as a place of welcoming and sharing. On the Imam’s request, the Friday sermon is both in Arabic and Italian. The Islamic offenders, also those coming from Central Africa, appreciated the trust and desire of exchange. When a mutual approach process is started, results are positive and visible. At the beginning there was a sort of fear, because the prison of Turin is very dispersive: it is indeed organised in 6 pavilions, among which the three pavilions accommodating male prisoners are very far from one another. There were many concerns due to the fear of the unknown. Initially, there were two different moments of prayer, at 12.00 and 2.30 p.m., with two different groups of detainees. As the mutual trust grew, the target of 150 offenders gathered together in the prayer place was reached. Even the penitentiary police, initially very sceptical, gradually accepted and supported this experience.
We have tried to explain to detainees that the Friday prayer is an ordinary and normal event. We have contacted the U.C.O.I.I (Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia, an Italian Islamic association) and, in collaboration with the Omar Ibn Al-Khattab mosque (placed in via Saluzzo) and the City of Turin, we have opened a dialogue. In order to overcome the diversity, a slow approach is required. However, some Imams did not event reply to the invitation of organising the Ramadan. This is a relentless process but we have to overcome fears, and the prison service as well as the civil society have to face this reality.
Now it is up to us to change the general atmosphere: there are almost 200 prisons in Italy. We have to take this into consideration and work with real figures.
Giovanni Battista Alberotanza
(Commander of the prison of Turin)
In order to identify the radicalisation elements, we do not have to take into consideration the external and physical factors only, such as the way offenders dress or the way their beard is shaved, but we also have to consider their behaviours. We are training our staff focusing on the observation of these behaviours, in particular the spontaneous ones. Militarised activities are not necessary and the security must be dynamic, not assigned to a single person in order to avoid the risk to provoke the so-called “mimetic” behaviours. In the prison of Turin, only two police officers were responsible for the security of 150 prisoners. This was possible thanks to the collaboration among all the professionals and the prisoners’ sense of responsibility. This experience highlighted an important aspect: the Islamic religion must not be confused with terrorism.
The treatment measures, such as the prisoners’ observation, highlight the spontaneous behaviours, thus preventing prisoners from pretending. In this sense, the Friday prayers and Imam’s presence as well as ethnic concerts were very useful. This new approach caused the reduction of self-injury behaviours and it contributed to the creation of an integrated security. The notion of dynamic security is linked to the concept of “integrated security”, that is, integrated by the contribution of the external community and the professionals responsible for treatments. There are no fixed security cameras in the Turin prison. In light of this fact, some behavioural changes were noticed during the Friday prayer not only in Muslims prisoners but also in newly-converted Italian prisoners, who are also subject to changes and violent radicalisation processes. We often focus on the second and third generation foreign prisoners, who are certainly the most vulnerable to radicalisation, but non-integrated Italian prisoners are also in high numbers.
We are seeking to avoid the ghettoisation of all prisoners, even those in the HS2 circuit. There are several counter recruitment and counter radicalisation measures aimed at reducing the conflict degree, for example, laical and cultural activities such as guided readings of the Arabic literature.
The police staff appreciated these activities, such as the Friday prayer, and encouraged prisoners’ participation, in light of the positive effects noticed. We have been seeking to create lighter forms of security: the activities as well as the moments of prayer, which are part of the individual rights and freedom, can not be militarised.
Another important factor relating to the staff training is the police officers attendance to a course about the countering and prevention of the violent radicalisation phenomenon. This course is divided into several modules and it addresses different aspects, such as:
- Arabic culture, Islam principles, Koran precepts, as knowledge may explain many detainees’ behaviours/attitudes. The staff can indeed better manage prisoners once they have learned the Koran precepts and cultural characteristics of the Arabic world. For example, if some prisoners commit acts of self-injury invoking Allah’s name, the prison staff can intervene asking for explanations, knowing that the Koran does not accept these acts. On one hand, this helps to come into contact with prisoners and, on the other hand, the prisoner themselves understand that in the future they can not make similar acts as means, for example, to obtain something misleading the prison staff since the latter is aware of the aspects and precepts of their culture;
- the cultural mediation explains to police officers how they should behave, for example, after the searches of the Koran (Koran has a place of honour in the prisoner cell and, after the searches, the police officer has to replace it in the original position, abiding by the individual rights of prisoners);
- regulatory aspects of public security;
- operative workshop, with the presence of both Commanders and psychologists, focused on the exchange of different operational practices adopted in different prisons.
I think that, today, on this occasion, the Rasmorad Project European partners are understanding how the Italian penitentiary service is working: it takes a step back, renouncing to the absolute control, recognising the importance of the prisoner’s freedom. This is representative of the cultural change our country is experiencing.
Dr. Luca Guglielminetti (email@example.com – https://hommerevolte2.blogspot.it)
Member of the “Leon Battista Alberti” association in Turin and of the European RAN WG, a professional counter radicalisation network with a strong presence in the Turin territory. For many years, he worked as consultant on the subject of radicalisation victims (he wrote a handbook based on the collected witnesses); he presents a work carried out within different fields and in collaboration with a professional network regarding violent extremism and radicalisation prevention. Among the other experiences, he draws up a map (local law enforcing agencies, penitentiary and probation services, administrations, etc.) in order to establish a link, through different working groups, between Europe and its Member States.
He directed a working group which gave voice and value to terrorism victims’ witnesses; for 15 years, he worked as a consultant for the Associazione italiana per le vittime del terrorismo (Italian association for the terrorism victims). The results of this working group were collected in a handbook on the use of these witnesses.
He points out that there has never been a real association for the terrorism victims, maybe because they do not develop empathy within the civil society. The most important propaganda means is terrorist attack: terrorists want to see the fear throughout the eyes of the victims. Terrorism breaks up indeed with the Social Contract and the victim remains isolated, hardly achieving the truth. The State has not always been able to prevent this event. Therefore, it is important to turn the victims from “passive individuals” into “active survivors”, because they are strong and they perfectly know what terrorism is as they lived it on their skin. The victims associations are self-help associations: they aim at turning passive victims into active victims.
How can we give value to terrorism victims’ witnesses, to what their eyes saw? Europe invites the Member States to discuss and realise policies for the different governments. A handbook entitled The victim’s Gaze was created. After Madrid’s terrorist attacks, a day for the terrorism victims was organised; since that moment, different projects started in Europe, including: an exhibition in Spain; the enhancement of a group of Austrian women, victims and former terrorists in The Netherlands; the development of European projects focused on victims’ witnesses (France) and an Italian project carried out by schools in the Turin territory.
The project, in partnership with France, aimed at raising awareness on the notion of terrorism in schools. In that period (2012/2013), terrorism related issues could not be treated in French schools. Since that moment, something has changed. In order to break the polarisation process, we have to speak about terrorism. In Italy, it is not a taboo subject. Carrying out a project relating to terrorism in schools is very important because many teachers do not hold much knowledge in this subject. Moreover, it is a methodological issue because students are involved in activities which are developed through tools and methods appropriate for them (video, rap music, etc.). We are seeking to improve the assessment and measure the impacts on students; it is also important to explain them the complexity of the historical background and geo-political context; the students should understand and accept the “kernel of truth”, besides the constitutional rights, they can not ignore the narrative. We should have the courage to be politically incorrect. However, can this approach be applied to prisoners?
Since the project end, in 2014, we have been seeking to create a working group on the model of the RAN in Italy as well. Some local organisations have worked on violent extremism issues according to territorial needs. An example of local needs in the city of Turin: among the returning foreign fighters, the number of those who have fought against the Kurds (generally against IS) is higher than those who have been engaged in the IS cause. For example, in the 1970’s, the Susa Valley was a front-line recruitment place, where the Italian Kurds learnt to use weapons. These policies take into consideration the local needs and therefore a global analysis is required.
Moreover, the Islam discussion is very important in schools; this experience was supported by different agencies, such as the CO.RE.IS (Community for Italian Muslims). In schools, we indeed observe that for second-generation Italian girls with Arabic origins, if an Italian Imam deals with topics similar to those discussed within family, he/she exercises more “empowerment” than an Arab Imam. This project has been carried out in schools for some years, focusing the attention on the possible effects of this activity. The educational course title is: “Islam: roots, foundations and violent radicalisation”.
Another local project, regarding polarisation and radicalisation, carried out by the Police, resulted in a photographic exhibition and discussions. Moreover, a urban security project realised by another local administration network was recognised at the European level: it involved 2 cities, Reggio Emilia and Bologna, and resulted in a Italian language handbook focused on training policies, which is especially addressed to youth associations (such as the Scout) and to the local Police. Some cities, such as Reggio Emilia, have chosen to train young people within associations; Bologna preferred to start within police setting. The aim is creating a multy-agencies cooperation for local policies.
Several training activities are mentioned, addressed to trainers and providing appropriate training methods in order to prevent radicalisation and train trainers, intercultural mediators and psychologists responsible for the post-trauma emergency. RAN young and RAN CESP are very significant as empowerment programmes.
U.C.O.I.I. delegates (2 speeches)
I congratulate the previous speakers on their important speeches regarding the countering of radicalisation towards, violence and, hate, and promotion of the religious freedom right. We have to fight the different interests.
As regards the relations between the Italian State and the Islam, there is not any agreement which recognises the Islam’s presence in Italy. Nowadays, Muslims can not benefit from several “privileges” conferred to other religions (for example, eight per thousand tax). This makes everything more complicated.
Many years ago, the U.C.O.I.I. built relations with Dr. Tamburino, working in the Rebibbia Prison and maintained them until today. The U.C.O.I.I.’s presence spread in 8 prisons, including Verona, Florence, Milan Bollate, Milan Opera and Turin.
In 2015 the U.C.O.I.I. concluded an agreement and submitted a list of 14 religious ministers, both men and women. Muslim women have indeed many possibilities, such as being Imam and teaching theology.
The DAP (Italian Department for the Penitentiary Administration), local representatives and the Islamic community started from scratch in dealing with prison context. A day of study has been organised for 14 Imams, who were identified in collaboration with the University of Padua. The U.C.O.I.I. carries out voluntary activities. This means that a well-prepared Imam, who speaks Italian and does not want to be paid can work in prison. Meetings have been organised in different prisons in order to understand how to proceed: for example, in Padua the prayer need is not so strong, and in other prisons other socio-cultural needs are prioritised.
Brief reflection on the self-proclaimed Imam in prison: this event could have positive effects if he/she has the appropriate requirements, otherwise it has negative effects. Self-proclaimed Imams are present in 50% of Italian prisons. The fact that a subject has two different status at the same time, prisoner and Imam, does not seem to be positive: being an Imam is not a consecration, like being priest, and their nomination has only an administrative value and not a religious one. The Imam has to lose some of his/her rights, such as the right of giving orders, in prison. The Islamic community and the DAP could create an elastic and dynamic model focused on the self-proclaimed Imam management.
Several meetings have been organised in prison in order to promote the Friday prayer as an example of legality. The Italian Law recognises all the Muslims rights. We talk about rights in a transparent way. During the Ramadan, we gave some food gift packages to prisoners and the Muslim community, in the mosque, raised funds with the help of young people. The Ramadan month is very important for the rights of Turin prisoners. We must underline the importance of women presence (volunteers) during family visits: an external person is required as volunteer in order to help and set a positive example for other people. Clear and transparent messages are absolutely necessaries. The “Insieme” Project (together against radicalisation) carried out by the Saluzzo mosque, with the help of the “La Stampa” newspaper, politicians and many others, was an important and very positive experience, to be repeated.
The lack of an official agreement with Islam is a serious problem; ensuring the dialogue is very difficult considering different events which have taken place in Italy for the mosque construction. Moderate Islam is essential both in prison and probation settings.
Prevention of radicalisation: Romanian experiences
Radicalisation prevention in Romanian prisons
There are 20 million inhabitants and 27 thousand prisoners in Romania,. Muslims are about 682 thousand in total, and, among them, 114 thousand are foreigners. The most relevant problem is that Romanian prisoners come from other countries (France, Belgium and Germany) where radicalisation ideology is very strong. There is a lack of information and understanding regarding this phenomenon. The number of radicalised people has grown since 2015.
In the future, the radicalisation risk will concern the internal prison security and national security.
Special courses for professionals and a one-month course for the prison staff are provided within the institutional context. The penitentiary administration has been involved in several European projects since 2008. There is a Department for crime and terrorism prevention, based on a schematic and hierarchical structure. As regards prevention, we pursue the applicable regulations: Security Regulation 756/2016 Government decision, etc.
Intelligence collects information, identifies the possible terrorists, using different tools, and then analyses the results together with the Department for security.
Case study: in 2015 a Craiova little boy coming from an Orthodox family was subject to radicalisation. His father has been in prison for minor offences and his mother was involved in prostitution activities. He started to send some videos, dressed as a terrorist, seeking to involve his friends and his mother. Then, he was imprisoned, without any access to Internet and isolated. His dream in life was going to Syria. He will have to serve a 5 years sentence. In Romania, psychologists deal with the radicalisation problem in an ordinary way because there are no specific de-radicalisation programmes.
After escaping, another boy went to France where he lived for 7 years. Then, he came back in 2015 attempting a terrorist attack: he said to his mother and his Imam that Islam gave him a better life. Over the sentence period, he did “normal” works. Prison is the best solution for many of them, even if the radicalisation risk is high, at least they do not have any external contacts, which could be worst.
Prevention of radicalisation: Cypriot experience
Radicalisation prevention in Cypriot prisons
The Central Jail of Nicosia is the only prison in Cyprus: it can contain up to 528 people but today there are 628 prisoners.
It is divided into 3 sections: the Open prison (work under monitoring), the Close prison (high security conditions, work, etc.), the Half-open prison (half-detention, half-liberty, etc.).
Prisoners’ rights are generally respected; socio-educational activities, health protection, without distinction of sex, colour and race, is ensured. It is a multicultural prison.
The prison’s administration is based on an individualistic and humanistic approach: the society condemns the prisoner, the professionals reform the prison and they carry out the procedures. The lack of freedom is punishment enough.
Prison services include medical, educational, workshop, psychiatric, psychological, therapeutic-occupational, school, musical, creative and theatrical services, also promoted by voluntary associations. Everybody is involved in the theatre activity.
Average age is 36 for arrested individuals and 40 for prisoners with a sentence of at least 2 years.
The most important offences are: drugs dealing, property crimes and sexual offences.
There were no serious problems regarding/involving radicalised prisoners, except for a Palestinian prisoner. Prisoners are divided into groups of 10 and benefit from a tailored approach.
Psychologists formulate prisoners’ profiles and those who are subject to a higher risk of radicalisation are observed with a particular care. There is also the release on parole.
The prisoners’ guarantor (Ombudsman) comes in prison and talks with them. The right of religious freedom is respected but proselytism is forbidden in prison.
Cyprus have participated in different European projects, such as the RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network), for years.
Discussion about mosques
A debate is opened on the complexity of Islam and, its recognition by the Italian State, the potential presence of mosques, the importance of training implementation, the Imam’s origin, education and competences. In Belgium, Imams are (low) paid and participate in some programmes collaborating with the prison professionals. Even if Imams are external to the prison context, the Belgian Muslim community send them in prison and the institutions look for them, they must have a high-level education and speak both English and French. The Imam has to be linked with the local reality, understand the local young people and he/she has to be aware of existing radicalisation problems.
5th July 2017 (afternoon)
(Director – DGMC)
Dr. Sonia Specchia briefly introduces the social services reform which has taken place in the Ministero della Giustizia (Italian Ministry of Justice). This reform has brought the Young Adults and Juveniles services, the UEPE (Italian probation services department) and the USSM (Italian department for juveniles social services) together.
(IPRS- Istituto Psicoanalitico per le ricerche sociali – Psychoanalithic Institute for Social Research)
The IPRS (Italian psychoanalytic Institute for social researches) representative mentions some phases of a research carried out by the Institute she belongs to: “an Italian multi-agency approach for the de-radicalisation of radicalised young people”.
The Project aims to underline local needs and create new training material. The objective is the creation of a multi-agency approach regarding de-radicalisation in probation area.
The surveys carried out in Turin’s territory show that the radicalisation phenomenon is not that wide in Italy: there were no serious terrorist attacks, there are no dominant ethnic groups, nor ghettos or counter terrorism experiences, but doubts remain about whether we will be prepared to deal with the members of the second and third generations growing up.
Exit and networking strategies as well as a strong cooperation with the local communities are required. It is important to create profiles taking into consideration prisoner’s personality, level and degree of risk. The use of counter narrative is essential for the radicalisation fight.
Profiles: mostly, they are born and raised in Italy, they are not foreigners (fear of the outside), generally they are juveniles and young adults. During the integration processes, several vulnerability factors and different forms of uneasiness appear, such as radicalisation.
The USSM and the UEPE of Turin have carried out 10 surveys about radicalisation experiences. There are no radicalisation experiences, at least externally, but it is necessary to pay attention to the sharing of information by using the Internet. Some communities were open to receive radicalised individuals (in trial period). The risk of underestimated indicators is high.
Each partner manages the network assessment.
The main bullet points of this multi-agency approach are:
- recognising the roles and duties of the involved actors;
- guaranteeing that the respective roles are clear;
- guaranteeing that the respective roles will be understood;
- importance of formalising agreements.
However, it is still essential to understand how to intervene, how to identify the problem and who is in charge of identifying the profiles. But, firstly, it is essential to understand local needs.
In France, there are some agencies who cross-reference data related to radicalised individuals or presumed radicalised individuals. The programmes, the social services as well as the collected data are great (in this way the Prefect knows immediately what to do) but sometimes things don’t work perfectly, we have to understand why.
Last session: WorkStream 1 – WorkStream 2
In the last session, the Project researchers have decided the future steps of the research.
We have to agree on the potential general objectives aimed at collecting data regarding risk assessment tools.
Discussions focused on: data collection methods, profile description, best-approach for radicalised subjects, professionals involved in this phase, use of protocols and risk assessment tools in prison.
France: today “Vera2” is used, in the past multidisciplinary tools were used. Some researches –action for the implementation of indicators were carried out with the University researchers.
UK: ‘Mapa 1’; ‘Mapa2’ and ‘Mapa 3’ are used for different subjects.
Portugal and Bulgaria: there are not any specific assessment models. It is essential to develop them.
We agree on sharing as much information as possible regarding research methodology.
The main objective is the identification of a series of standard tools, paying attention to confidentiality.
- developing a new operative tool, which has to be tested;
- identifying and formulating standards;
- creating a common tool in order to measure: criteria, benchmarks and indicators. The final result of the project is the creation of a tool for identifying “violent radicalised” individuals;
- all the steps have to be described in a report;
- in the final phase, after a comparative analysis, guidelines and recommendations (as an introduction and a preamble) regarding the radicalisation risk assessment will be formulated.
In the week following the meeting, the questionnaire n.2 regarding risk assessment to filled within 20th of August will be sent to all partners.
The next meeting (thematic workshop) will take place on 11th and 12th of September.